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2“In the world of finance, the impact of the
Eurocurrency system is comparable to that of
coke smelting in the development of iron and
steel, the steam engine in the development of
railways, and the computer in information
processing.”
T.M. Podolski, Financial Innovation and the
Money Supply (London: Basil Blackwell,
1986): 113.
Modern financial theories based on the economics of information suggest that banks
arise as a response to existing frictions in the process of acquiring information and
making transactions. Bank intermediaries ameliorate such frictions thanks to brokerage
(which enhances the matching of borrowers and lenders by overcoming information
asymmetries) and portfolio transformation (acting as delegated monitors and providing
liquidity insurance). The way banks perform these functions—their ‘financial
technology’—changed dramatically in the 1970s on a global scale. We define financial
technology as a body of knowledge that specifies the whole range of activities creating
economic value in financial intermediation, which encompasses product, process and
organizational technologies. Financial innovations occur in each of these areas and
improve the efficiency with which intermediaries perform their basic functions by
expanding opportunities for risk sharing, lowering transaction costs and reducing
asymmetric information and agency costs.1
The transformations of the 1970s reversed four decades characterized by the
absence of significant innovations in the banking industry, as well as by the pervasive
regulation of the latter by the state—a regime of financial “repression” or “restriction”
articulated in “a set of policies, laws, regulation, taxes, distortions, qualitative and
quantitative restrictions, which do not allow financial intermediaries to operate at their
full technological potential”. 2 An “explosion of financial innovations”, both in
instruments and strategies, altered radically the features of financial decision making.3 At
the same time, financial intermediaries began successfully to press in favor of a gradual
withdrawal of the state as financial regulator. As a consequence, a twofold process of
liberation of existing financial technology and, at one time, a rapid shift forward of the
3frontier of financial technology characterized the two decades between the late 1960s and
the early 1980s. How were financial innovation and financial deregulation related one
each other? How did technological change, and in particular information and
communication technologies originating mainly outside the financial sector, contribute to
this epoch-making shift? And how did technological and institutional changes interact in
reshaping the global financial structure?
We explore some of these issues by focusing on possibly the most important and
far-reaching change in financial technology that took place around the 1970s: the rise of
liability management (aka ‘marketization’ of banking), a process innovation based on the
development of wholesale interbank markets, both domestic and international. This
innovation dramatically changed the concept of liquidity in banking, forced banks to
implement totally new strategies of active liability marketing, and required a new
interactive banking management of the structure of assets and liabilities.
At the origin of such epoch-making change stands the emergence and explosive
growth of the so-called Eurocurrency (mostly Eurodollar) banking. The Eurodollar
market used to be a most controversial issue. Particularly during the period of financial
instability of the late 1960s throughout the 1970s, the astounding expansion of the
market raised fierce arguments both of theoretical and political relevance. Under severe
scrutiny by both economists and politicians went its capacity of creating potentially
unlimited international liquidity, and transmitting inflationary pressures on a worldwide
scale. The market was also blamed for its role as a source of funds for speculation and
short-term capital movements, with destabilising effects on the international monetary
system. It was often regarded as kind of “an unregulated juggernaut ‘out of control’ ”
that undermined national sovereignty of monetary authorities and increasingly
frustrated their capacity to control domestic money supply. Such debate seemed to
generate more heat than light however. The nature of the Euro-dollar market was long
considered as an intriguing “mystery story”. 4 Even twenty years after their first
appearance, some argued that “the size of the external, or Eurofinancial, markets is
matched only by the aura of mystery and controversy they have generated”, so that
“they continue to appear to be an enigma even to those who operate in them
continually”5. Over time however such aura of mystery, together with general concerns
4about its unbridled expansion (and possible sudden contraction), gradually faded away,
as many of the old controversies did. As Ralph Bryant later argued, the Eurodollar
market has to be considered a key manifestation, but certainly not the only one, of
increasing financial interdependence of national economies. In this sense, it contributed
to exchange rate instability, transmission of inflation, increased riskyness of financial
intermediation, and injured control over monetary and credit aggregates. Still it would
be totally incorrect to identify Eurobanking as “the villain chiefly responsible for these
problems”.6
This paper outlines the historical developments of the Eurodollar market from
the origins to the early 1980s and their implications for international banks of
industrialised countries. Though the Eurodollar market was only one segment of the
overall market for Eurocurrencies, its relative size, the dominant influence of its interest
rate in determining the structure of Eurocurrency rates, and its role as the core of Euro-
business for a large majority of international banks in the 1960s and 1970s justify the
choice of focusing on it. As a matter of fact, the dollar-denominated segment was
permanently the largest one of the Eurocurrency market, and currency diversification
by banks was a function of the degree of confidence in the dollar. Between 1964 and
1984 the Eurodollar market share (i.e. Eurodollars as a percentage of all
Eurocurrencies) fluctuated within a range of 72% and 84%, recording a sizeable decline
only after 1985 due to the deteriorating value of the dollar. Moreover, the Eurodollar
rate and the dollar forward exchange rate have been demonstrated to be the pivotal
factors that determined the whole spectrum of Eurocurrency rates.7
The paper covers the initial phase of the “Golden Age” of international banking
(1960s-1970s), brought to an end in 1981-83 by the global recession that followed the
second oil shock, the debt crisis of developing countries and a shift of international
finance away from bank intermediation towards financial markets (securitisation).
More specifically, the paper argues that the development of the Eurodollar market has
to be considered an evolutionary process that induced a transition towards structural
change in Western banking. Section 1 defines Eurobanking by presenting a concise
outline of its institutional evolution from an international interbank money market to a
more complex banking activity involving interrelationships with the emerging
5international capital markets. Section 2 briefly reviews some key issues of the
theoretical debate as to the nature of Eurobanking (multiplier VS portfolio approach)
and its implications for alternatives explanations of the astounding growth rate of
international financial intermediation. Section 3 elaborates on the relative importance of
real-sector and institutional factors (international trade and business cycle, regulation
and capital controls, arbitrage) in different phases of the market's history. Section 4
finally illustrates the role of the Eurodollar business as a factor of structural innovation
in Western banking both at systemic level (from regulated, oligopolistic, disintegrated
banking systems towards a less regulated, competitive, integrated financial
environment) and at microeconomic level (“marketisation” of banking, asset and
liability management). Section 5 concludes.
1. The Eurodollar Technology: The Rise of an International Money
Market
In the financial jargon of the 1960s “Eurodollar” became the popular name of dollar-
denominated short-time wholesale deposits held by banks located outside the USA—
foreign branches and subsidiaries of US banks included—principally in European
financial centres (hence the prefix “Euro”).8 As such, Eurodollars did not represent any
significant financial product innovation: they were merely dollar time deposits that
happened to be booked in banking offices outside the USA. Neither was the practice of
banking with foreign currency deposits new at all in the old continent. Operations in
foreign currency deposits were well known in London before the First World War, and
similar transactions denominated in sterling and dollars had been also negotiated in
Berlin and Vienna in the late 1920s, before being brought abruptly to an end by the
1931 crisis.9 Thanks to a gradual relaxation of foreign exchange controls during the
1950s, the practice of taking dollar deposits to finance international trade re-emerged in
Western Europe; by 1960 some European banks were well known in international
financial circles for actively engaging in bilateral interbank transactions in dollars.10
What was really innovative and unprecedented was the creation of a true
international market for wholesale dollar deposits, which rapidly established itself as
the centre of a network linking all major Western economies. It was after the general
6return to external convertibility of all major Western currencies in 1958 that the
practice of trading in dollar time deposits gained momentum and scope. Technological
innovations in data processing and communications (transactions were arranged over
the telephone or by telex) played a critic role in the process. Beyond the impact of
technology, however, it was the rapid erosion of information barriers (so that all market
participants could get all information available at low cost and agreed on the
implications of current information) and the consequent comparative advantages in
transaction costs that made it possible the evolution of trading from bilateral to
multilateral, from correspondent banking to transaction banking, thus leading to the
establishment of an almost perfectly efficient market 11 . At the initial stages, the
information pooled by brokers in the City of London was vital, but soon large banks
created autonomous units of dealers as a means of improving their ability to monitoring
the market's mood.12
As far as the market structure is concerned, prime depositors (also indicated as
‘lenders’) were large corporations (both US and non-US) with international and
multinational activities, commercial banks located in main financial centres of the
Western hemisphere (including countries beyond the Iron curtain and Arab countries)13,
central banks (mainly out of Europe) and, limited to the early period of the market,
international financial institutions such as the Basle-based Bank for International
Settlements.14 Final users (or ‘borrowers’) were mainly large international corporations,
which used Eurodollar short-term facilities as an alternative to finance their
international trade. Large commercial banks and other banking institutions located
outside the USA, mainly in Western Europe, played as intermediaries between
depositors and borrowers. The City of London immediately emerged as the main
trading hub. Here the initial dominance of merchant banks and British overseas banks
declined rapidly. Due the binding regulation (such as the imposition of a 8% cash
reserve ratio and a 28% liquid assets ratio), also UK clearing banks found themselves
with a structural disadvantage in Eurobanking until the 1971 banking reform and had to
enter the Eurodollar business through specialised wholesale subsidiaries and
participation in consortium banks. By the late 1960s foreign branches or subsidiaries
(including consortia banks) of major commercial banks from industrialised countries
7had already conquered the market leadership, with foreign branches of large American
money-centre banks in a dominant position.15
As both depositors and borrowers were often resident of countries other than the
country in which Eurobanks were located (although in London a sizeable portion of the
business occurred among banking offices based in the City), Eurodollar banking is
usually defined as external intermediation. Such definition, officially adopted by the
Bank for International Settlements and other institutions to provide a statistical
representation of Eurocurrency aggregates, is to some extent analytically misleading, in
that it suggested that Eurobanking was kind of “special” phenomenon, radically
different from “ordinary” banking. In fact, although Eurobanking was the emerging
frontier of international financial intermediation since the 1960s, it originated from—
and was closely linked to—traditional international banking, either cross-border or
cross-currency, mainly channelled through the foreign exchange markets.16 Moreover,
traditional international banking also expanded rapidly and kept providing the largest
portion of actual means of international payments—i.e., short-term credits for trade
financing and hedging forward against exchange risk17. As a consequence, “there is no
compelling reason for isolating one aspect of international banking and analysing it
independently of the rest of the nexus of financial relations linking nations together”.18
Important facets of the Eurodollar market were its multi-tier structure and the
large portion of business accounted for by interbank dealings. The tiering of the market
reflected different creditworthiness and risk assigned by investors to different banks,
with large commercial US banks and more generally dollar-based institutions (such as
Canadian banks) in the top ranking positions as prime takers at marginally lower rates
than second and third-tiering banks. Tiering used to become more pronounced in times
of liquidity strains or confidence crisis, such as in 1974 after the collapse of Bankhaus
Herstatt (a German bank) and Franklin National Bank (a New York institutions ranging
17th among US commercial banks). 19 A sizeable part of funds allocated in the
Eurodollar market operated through interbank redepositing—sometimes also termed
misleadingly “pyramiding”—with very narrow spreads (between 0,125 to 0,0625 per
cent per annum equivalent) between "bid" rates (the rate at which banks are ready to
borrow in the market) and "offer" rate (the rate at which banks offer to lend funds in the
8market). This meant that a chain of several banks, whether located in a major financial
centre (such as London) or in different countries, could serve as intermediary between
original depositors and final borrowers. As shown in Figure 1, the incidence of
interbank transactions on total Eurobanking grew from 30 per cent at the mid-1960s to
50 per cent in 1980 of the total Eurocurrency market. 20
FIGURE 1 HERE
The relative volume of interbank activity turned out to be even larger when figures
were limited to BIS reporting countries. In the early 1980s about 70 per cent of foreign
currency assets and liabilities (both within-border and cross-border) was accounted for
by lending between banks. The figure would be slightly smaller (about 60 per cent) if
measured on the base of the “inside area” positions—i.e. positions of reporting area
banks vis-à-vis banks in major financial centres, which represented the “hard core” of
interbank market.21 It is worth noting also that a substantial part of interbank business in
the 1970s and 1980s was “inter-office”, as it took place between offices of the same
bank: a practice that enabled large multinational banks to internalise the functions of
the interbank market.22
The enlarging scope for interbank dealings provided the base for the emergence
and the expansion of Eurocapital markets. Since the early 1970s, a rapidly increasing
demand for medium- and long-term dollar loans by large international corporate and
sovereign borrowers induced Eurobanks to extend the maturity of part of their lending
business.23 Fixed-interest loans with medium-term maturity (2-3 years) provided by
individual Eurobanks in the early phase of the Eurocredit market gave soon way to
innovative bank products such as flexible term-loans with longer maturity (stretching
up to 4-to-8 years). These credits were provided at floating rate on a roll-over basis
(determined as a fix spread over the costs of funding in the market and adjusted every
three or six months to prevailing short-term Eurodollar interbank rate, or LIBOR) by
specialised institutions such as consortia banks or by international bank syndicates,
sometimes under the co-ordination of merchant banks. 24 The Eurocredit market was
closely linked to the Eurodollar market, since Eurobanks secured in the latter a large
9amount of funds used to finance their Euroloans portfolio. Occasionally, when short-
term interest rates turned higher then long-term rates, borrowers used to temporarily
redeposit part of the proceeds of syndicated loans, pending use, in the Euro-money
market. The Eurodollar market had also important links with the Eurobond market,
where international bank syndicates engaged in managing, underwriting and placing
bonds issued by corporate and sovereign borrowers. 25 In fact, investment banks,
securities firms and commercial banks acting either as managers of new Eurobond
issues or market makers of the secondary market financed part of their underwriting
commitments by borrowing in the Eurodollar and other Eurocurrency market.26
2. Understanding The New Technology: Multiplier vs Portfolio Approach
From its origins to the early 1980s, and in spite of occasional and short-lived setbacks,
international banking as a whole expanded at a breath-taking pace both in volume and
scope (as shown in Figure 2).
FIGURE 2 HERE
Figures reported in Table 1 show that the gross size of the Eurocurrency market,
traditionally measured as the outstanding external positions (i.e., foreign currency
liabilities or assets vis-à-vis non-residents) of reporting banks in 15 OECD countries
and other selected Eurocurrency offshore centres grew at an average annual compound
rate of 26 % in the period from 1964 to 1985, passing from $ 20 to 2,600 billion
equivalent (at current prices and exchange rates).27 Even when adjusted in order to
allow for double-counting arising from interbank operations (i.e., growth of net size)28
as well as the secular upward trend of inflation, those figures remain striking.29
TABLE 1 HERE
Their growth rate largely outpaced that of domestic banking, and showed a slow-down
only in the early 1980s as a consequence of both short-term factors (the global
recession and the debt crisis of developing countries) and structural changes such as the
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adoption of more prudential attitudes by international banks and general displacement
of international bank credit due to increasing “securitisation”.
What explains such remarkable performance? Why did banks expand so rapidly
their external intermediation? This question became a key issue of the original
Eurodollar debate. Early attempts to explain the growth of the Eurodollar market
pointed to the existence of an endogenous credit creation process. 30 Theoretical
investigation was urged by widespread concerns as to what was regarded as a
potentially unconstrained ability of the market to create credit with global inflationary
consequences. According to the multiplier hypothesis, Eurodollar growth was supposed
to be a function of some credit or deposit multiplier because a proportion of funds lent
out by banks to non-bank borrowers was redeposited with them. This implied that the
Eurobanking system could be compared to a certain extent to a domestic banking
system based on fractional reserves. Such hypothesis however proved less than
satisfactory, since it tended to misrepresent basic institutional features of Eurobanking
and was unable to reach clear-cut conclusions. No Eurobanking system existed as such
as a closed or autonomous system (since it was an open system linking national systems
together), and Eurobanks used to hold reserves not with central banks but with other
commercial banks. Moreover, the overly attention paid to original lenders and final
non-bank borrowers overlooked the critical importance of interbank market. At the
same time, empirical estimates of the actual base of the multiplier and the size of the
multiplier itself proved both difficult and subject to large discrepancies. Finally,
redepositing by non-banks suffered substantial leakage towards national systems, so
that the multiplier, if any, could be in any case only a minor factor of Euromarket's
growth.31
Severe inconsistencies of multiplier models were mainly emphasised by
supporters of a different view, the so-called “portfolio approach”. Moving along the
lines drawn by Gurley and Shaw and Tobin, the “new view” set an original theoretical
framework in which banking (and non-banking) intermediaries and primary securities
markets were seen to compete for deposits and loans by issuing liabilities and
purchasing claims from borrowers. Thus their ability to expand their balance sheet
(i.e., their stock of assets and liabilities) depended ultimately on the portfolio
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preferences of wealth-holders, influenced in turn by particular attributes (relative
return, riskiness, liquidity) of the liabilities issued.32 Portfolio approach has proved
particularly helpful in shedding light on both the nature and the operating mechanism of
Eurobanking. First, it has correctly emphasised that Eurodollars, as short-term yield-
earning time deposits, did non represent “money” in its narrowly defined sense (i.e.,
means of payment)33, although like other money market assets with a high degree of
liquidity they could be considered as “near money” (close substitutes for money held in
anticipation of payments and readily liquidated). Since Eurodollar deposits were close
though imperfect substitutes of domestic deposits and money market assets, Eurobanks
could expand their balance sheets by competing with other intermediaries and markets
in attracting dollar funds from wealth-holder.34 Thus, credit expansion in the Eurodollar
(external) market – as a time-deposit system fundamentally different from a checking
account system – was made possible by a process of substitution of near money for
money (increased velocity of a given stock of money) that occurred within a growing
world-wide dollar-denominated credit market. As Gunter Dufey and Ian Giddy put it,
the market was “a growing slice of an expanding pie”.35
3. Explaining Eurodollar Innovation: Real Factors vs Deregulation
The strong theoretical appeal of the portfolio approach derives primarily from the fact
that, by shifting attention towards institutional features of the system, it contributed to
bring to light new factors such as the interest rate linkages between domestic and
external markets, the fundamental role of the Eurodollar market as a channel for
international capital flows, and the economic forces behind supply of deposits and
demand for loans. As a consequence, explanations of the growth of the market have
paid an increasing attention to the impact of real-sector forces (business cycle, credit
conditions) and to institutional factors, such as arbitrage and regulation, which affected
the banks' behaviour in the market.
Real-sector-led explanations of the market’s growth point to the expansion of
international trade (and to the increasing multinationalisation of industrial companies)
as the main driver of international financial intermediation, and view cross-border
financial activity as the financing counterpart of trade or intracompany transactions.36
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As a matter of fact, early theoretical interpretation of the Euro-currency market also
focused on trade influences (the need to maintain working balances in foreign
currencies, and particularly in dollars for the financing of international trade),
suggesting that high transaction costs involved in moving between domestic and
foreign currencies had encourage traders to hold balances denominated in international
currencies. Subsequent econometric research provided further evidence of a
relationship between Eurocurrency deposits and the growth of international trade,
arguing that the international holdings of currencies were related to trade transactions.
More specifically, Eurodollar deposits acted as substitutes for forward exchange
contracts, since transaction cost advantages existed in making a large spot purchase of
dollars and investing it in the Euro-markets at different maturities to coincide with
payments abroad rather than making a number of forward contracts.37
Among real-sector factors, large demand for Eurocredits by corporate (included
state-owned companies) and sovereign borrowers with large investment programmes
proved a driving force behind the expansion of the market since the late 1960s. A
further shift followed the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 due to increasing demand for
external finance by governments of industrialised and developing countries, matched by
petro-dollar recycling (the channelling through the Euro-markets of the cash surplus of
oil-exporting countries). 38 (See Figure 2 again) As far as Eurobanking can be
considered a satisfactory proxy for international banking as a whole, however, also the
growth rate of its net size (i.e., excluding interbank redepositing) demonstrates that
international financial intermediation expanded at a remarkably faster pace than world
output and international trade from 1964 to 1985 (see again Table 1)39. Some other
factors have therefore to be considered.
Among these, all studies dealing with the economics of the Euromarket
unanimously emphasised the lack of regulatory constraints as a crucial factor for its
expansion.40 Both in the USA and in Western Europe domestic banking was subject to
tight regulation, either imposed by national monetary and supervisory authorities,
mainly in the form of discriminatory credit allocation, reserve requirements, interest
rate ceilings on deposits and loans, prudential capital-to-asset ratios, barriers to entry,
market segmentation, or enforced by private interbank cartel arrangements. Compared
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with the modest opportunities for growth offered by domestic intermediation, the
Eurodollar market in London – where British monetary authorities guaranteed free
access and allowed foreign currency business of both UK and foreign banks to develop
outside binding regulation imposed on the domestic (sterling) sector, as a means of
reviving the role of the City as an international entrepôt centre41 – was conspicuous for
its totally unregulated and competitive nature. Moreover, in spite of the gradual
relaxation of exchange controls after the return to external convertibility in 1958 (which
actively contributed to the booming Eurodollar market), the widespread presence of
capital controls—until 1973 in the USA and West Germany, until 1979 in the UK, well
beyond the 1980s in France and Italy42 —imposed additional costs on international
financial transactions43 and limited to some extent the expansion of banks' international
business. Similar regulatory discrimination had also an impact on different segments of
the Euromarkets. The absence of government and foreign exchange authorities controls,
less detailed offering prospectus, tolerance for scarce attitude to disclosure and fiscal
exemptions, together with low interest rates and underwriting costs and substantial
economies in transaction costs (relative to raising capital piecemeal in each individual
country), prove critical factors that accounted for the rapid expansion of Eurocapital
markets.44
During the 1960s and 1970s Eurobanking, harmed by regulatory constraints
when conducted from home-based head offices, was therefore increasingly attracted
into entrepôt financial centres such as London and Luxembourg or small offshore
centres. Banks interested in an internationally- and growth-oriented strategy
successfully circumvented domestic regulation and tax regimes by developing a
multinational structure, thus increasingly moving external intermediation—which
turned out to be sometimes purely domestic intermediation in disguise 45—out of their
domestic jurisdiction (see Table 2).
TABLE 2 HERE
Also related to the growing internationalisation of banking was an increasing presence
of foreign banks in New York and other US banking centres. This was mainly
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motivated by their desire to gain direct access to the US domestic market. Additional
incentives were provided before 1978 by a regulatory discrimination in favour of
foreign banks relative to US banks.46 These were reinforced by the introduction in 1981
of International Banking Facilities, which lifted regulatory constraints on international
business of banks in the US (either domestic or foreign), thus enabling for the first time
New York to compete with London in attracting Eurobanking.47
The overseas expansion of American banks was particularly striking. Only 8 US
banks were operating overseas branches in 1960; they had become 163 in 1984.48
Multinationalisation of American banking was actively though involuntarily promoted
by US government and monetary authorities through monetary policy and balance of
payments control programs. During the credit crunches of 1966 and 1969, the use of
binding regulation (in the form of interest rate ceiling on interest rates payable on time
deposits and negotiable Certificates of deposits – the so-called Regulation Q) induced
American banks to resort to the Eurodollar market through their London-based and
overseas branches in order to channel these funds back to the USA. 49 By doing so, they
successfully opposed to disintermediation threats brought home by both Eurobanks and
new competing domestic money markets (such as that on commercial paper). In the
same period heavy bidding for Eurodollars by US banks was also a consequence of
rising demand for Eurodollar loans from US corporations' subsidiaries in Europe, since
voluntary and mandatory capital control programs enforced by the Johnson
administration limited their parents' ability to transfer funds out of the USA and curbed
US banks' lending abroad. Such factors exerted a major expansionary impact on the
Eurodollar market, which accounts for its extraordinary growth rate in the second half
of the 1960s.50
Demand from US banks and corporations however rapidly declined after 1970
when US monetary authorities relaxed monetary policy, discouraged Eurodollar
borrowing by imposing marginal reserve requirements on borrowing by parent banks
from their overseas branches and enhanced the competitiveness of the domestic market
by lifting Regulation Q ceilings on large deposits and CDs. Moreover, the shift towards
financial liberalism promoted by the Nixon administration led in 1974 to the removal of
the capital controls introduced in the 1960s51. However, in spite of a marked decline in
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the forces that had fostered the market's growth, Eurobanking kept expanding. This
apparently paradoxical result shifts our attention to other forces (beyond real-sector
developments and regulation) of critical relevance for the market's growth as well as for
its working: the structure of interest rates and the arbitrage process.
Historical series give empirical evidence of strong covariance of interest rates in
the Eurodollar market and in the USA. Even more significantly, the Eurodollar rate also
commanded a permanent premium both on bank time deposits and relevant money
market instruments, as shown in Figure 3, which illustrates the trend of Eurodollar and
relevant US money market rates and the nominal differential between LIBOR and the
nominal interest rate on 3-month CDs in the USA. 52
FIGURE 3 HERE
This close concordance of Eurodollar and US rates variations suggests the existence of
a causal relationship between monetary conditions in the USA and the Eurodollar
interest rate.53 This can be partly accounted for by the relative size of the US money
market and monetary aggregates as compared to the Eurodollar market and the absence
of currency risk. Recent literature on the economics of the Euromarkets however agrees
upon crediting both premium and covariance to increasingly efficient arbitrage.54
Under such respect, the revolutionary impact of innovations in communication
technology on banking has to be stressed time and again. The technology-led revolution
in the delivery of financial services (information processing and transmission,
confirmation of transactions, electronic funds transfer and accounting) critically
contributed to reduce economic distances between national financial systems. This
dramatically enhanced the responsiveness to opportunities for cross-currency and cross-
border arbitrage both by suppliers of funds (cross-border and currency ladling in search
for higher expected yields on foreign financial assets) and final users (borrowing funds
internationally to profit from more favourable loan terms than those available
domestically). 55 Banks were particularly well positioned to exploit such profit
opportunities as a major vehicles for information about foreign financial systems. Such
privileged position was further enhanced by the general trend towards multinational
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banking (mentioned above), which gave banks direct access to information, arbitrage
and intermediation activities in foreign and international markets.56
The arbitrage process represents the key-factor of supply-and-demand models of
the Eurodollar market based on interest parity theory and portfolio adjustment by
depositors, borrowers and intermediaries. 57 Such models emphasise the role of the
market in the process of financial integration as a channel for short-term capital
movements as well as the role of the Eurodollar rate as the focal price in an
increasingly interdependent financial system.58 In fact the emergence and growth of
Eurobanking can be principally accounted for by the emergence of new international
arbitrage channels. For dollar-holding investors (either US or non-US resident), an
American bank or the US money-markets were natural outlets for their funds, as well as
for dollar borrowers an American (or at least dollar-based) bank was the natural source
of lending. Thus, apart from depositors in search for anonymity (for political, fiscal or
other reasons) and assuming factors such as familiarity, business hours and
communications to play a marginal role in a market where transactors were large banks,
public entities and international corporations with advanced communication
technology, Eurobanks had to offer competitive conditions in order to compete with US
banks. This implied offering higher returns on dollar time deposits (thus increasing the
attractiveness of Eurodeposits relative to US time deposits and other money market
assets) and charging lower interest on Eurodollar loans relative to standard lending
rates (prime rate) in the USA.
As a consequence, Eurobanks operated permanently on a narrower spread than
banks in the US domestic market and in most part of national markets. As said, profit in
interbank business could result as small as 1/8 of one point per cent or even less,
although it was substantially higher in medium- or long-term lending to non-bank
borrowers. Still Eurobanking was profitable due to its institutional features. Eurodollar
borrowing by banks was in fact exempted from reserve requirements and other
regulatory constraints; administrative costs were low (because of economies of scale)
and transaction and information costs only marginal, thanks to communication
technology and an efficient brokerage system59. Eurobanks were therefore prepared to
17
shift most benefits of lower operating costs to depositors and borrowers in the form of
higher returns on deposits and lower rates charged on loans respectively.
The ability to attract depositors and borrowers out from the US domestic market
to the external market through arbitrage channels was therefore the key-factor in the
continued expansion of Eurobanks' business. Under favourable conditions and in the
absence of binding capital controls, moreover, they could also induce cross-currency
arbitrage, attracting depositors and borrowers from non-US markets in search for higher
returns and better conditions than those obtainable domestically. A sizeable though
minor part of Eurodeposits came in fact from Western European investors switching
out from domestic currencies into Dollar positions, when the differential between the
Eurodollar rate and domestic rates, adjusted for covering against exchange rate risk,
proved profitable.60
Beyond the creation of new arbitrage channels for depositors and borrowers,
however, Eurobanks have also to be analysed as arbitrageurs themselves. A number of
analytical studies have suggested arbitrage induced by banks' portfolio-behaviour
(rather than by depositors) to account for the covariation of Eurodollar and US rates.61
As a matter of fact empirical analysis of the determination of the Eurodollar rate
demonstrated that, in the absence of restrictions on free flow of capital, Eurocurrency
rates have been tied within narrow margins to the level of US money market rates by
the arbitrage activity of US banks in the efficient interbank market. Incentive to
Eurodollar arbitrage was provided by the fact that Eurodeposits, as reserve-free
substitutes of domestic bank deposits, in a fashion similar to other non-bank
innovations such as repurchase agreements, money market funds, and commercial
paper, allowed banks to reduce their overall holdings of reserve, thus providing
“avenues for the growth of credit that are not directly constrained by the supply of
reserves to US banks”62. Arbitrage took mainly the form of balance-sheet-expanding
outward arbitrage, which implied raising funds in the US CDs market (or in the
commercial paper market through bank holding companies) and moving them offshore
to invest them at a slightly higher return with Eurobanks, until domestic and external
interest rates adjusted to remove arbitrage incentives or banks reached internal arbitrage
constraints (such as perceived risk, capital-to-asset and return-on-assets ratios). 63
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Eurodollar arbitrage made the domestic and external dollar money market increasingly
integrated and efficient, thus tending to limit the interest rate differential.64
The existence of large interest rate differential between Eurodollar and domestic
time deposits for long periods in the history of the market, especially in the second half
of the 1960s and early 1970s, as Figure 3 shows, may cast doubts on the efficiency of
bank arbitrage to maintain interest parity. However, other factors have to be taken into
account. One was the impact of US capital controls and bank regulation up to the early
1970s. As a matter of fact, during the 1966 and 1969 credit crunches New York banks
borrowed heavily on the Eurodollar market through their European branches, whereas
Regulation Q ceilings prevented free adjustment of domestic CDs rates to rising
Eurodollar rates.65 Eurodollar arbitrage was moreover impaired by capital controls that
prohibited US banks to export abroad funds raised domestically, and tight credit
conditions in the US account also for the Eurodollar rate to remain mainly above prime
rate until the early 1970s. Unusually large Eurodollar differentials therefore reflected
increased market segmentation. After this exceptional period, however, easing of
monetary policy by the FED and the removal by the Nixon administration of
Regulation Q ceilings on CDs in 1970 made the US domestic market more competitive.
With gradual relaxation of capital controls (lifted at the end of 1973), interest-rate
linkages between the internal and the external sectors were strengthened, US banks
turned into net lenders to the market and the arbitrage process became much more
efficient, responding to even marginal changes in liquidity and interest rate. Figures in
Table 3 suggest that this was reflected in a clear trend towards a structural reduction in
the interest differential between the Eurodollar and the US money market.66
TABLE 3 HERE
In explaining the Eurodollar differential, changes in perceived risk have also to be
taken into account. Depositors used to consider Eurodollars deposits structurally riskier
than US deposits, since they were uninsured, held by banks with no direct access to the
FED discount window, and located outside the legal jurisdiction of the USA. Moreover,
riskyness varied from bank to bank: deposits placed with European branches of large
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American banks were almost perfect substitutes of domestic deposits, whereas the
“tiering” of the market reflected differences in risk associated with different categories
of banks. Finally, perceived risk was also influenced by rumours of government
intervention (mostly in the form of additional regulation, since vulnerability to
sovereign risk stemming from restricted transferability or blocking of repayments was
generally regarded as unlikely), confidence crisis—such as the already mentioned
episodes of 1974 involving Herstatt Bank and Franklin National Bank—and increasing
instability of the international monetary system (such as the rising concerns about
dollar exchange rate deterioration throughout the 1970s).67
Over time however changes in the perception of Eurodollar risk by agents may
have contributed to a structural reduction of differential. While rapid dissemination of
both theoretical and practical knowledge of the Euromarkets eroded information
barriers to arbitrage, the resiliency of the market itself throughout the financial turmoil
of the late 1960s and early 1970s, in spite of recurring worries within international
banking circles about the possibility of its sudden contraction, disappearance or
collapse, allowed depositors to gradually downgrade the additional perceived risk.
After the crisis episodes of 1974 raised the alarm, most banks autonomously upgraded
internal controls and extended their responsibility for branches and affiliates' exposure
under the so called “principle of corporate liability” typical of the US legal tradition.68
At the same time, as a result of closer co-operation among central banks within the BIS,
epitomised in the Basle declaration of 1974 on lender-of-last-resort assistance to the
Euromarkets in the case of liquidity crisis, and the 1975 supervisory guidelines known
as the “Basle Concordat”, monetary authorities enforced improved monitoring and
tighter prudential supervision.69 After two decades of development, large liquidity (as a
direct function of size), increased integration, closer substitutability and the full
manifestation of the information effect (i.e., the fact that market participants had to
complete a learning curve to adjust their portfolio strategies) made Euro-markets even
more attractive to both depositors and borrowers, who perceived the risk of conducting
business in the external markets only marginally greater than in national markets. This
is likely to have contributed to a secular decline in the interest-rate incentive required to
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attract depositors and borrowers from the domestic to the external market, thus making
the arbitrage schedule more elastic70.
4. Eurodollars and Structural Innovation in Banking: The Shift to Liability
Management
The revolutionary impact of the Eurodollar market on Western financial systems could
hardly be overemphasised. As a matter of fact, Eurobanking proved a factor of epoch-
making structural change of banking in industrialised countries. In a traditional world
of closed and disintegrated national systems, dominated by regulation, oligopolistic
structure and collusive behaviour, barriers to entry, market segmentation and lack of
innovation, suddenly a fast-growing unregulated enclave of wholesale business
emerged, based on international integration, free access, keen market competition and
technological as well as financial innovation. Eurobanking represented therefore to
large commercial banks of Western countries, which generally enjoyed little scope for
domestic expansion, an unprecedented and largely unexpected opportunity for growth.
Such opportunity however brought with it also major challenges.
Up to the mid-1960s, risk implied in engaging in Eurodollar remained low and
Eurocurrency banking was a fairly simple business that could be easily run by banks
through their traditional international functions, normally a small department that
offered services related to trade finance and dealt with correspondent banks. Over time
commercial banks learnt how to use the international interbank market also for
domestic purposes, that is, to adjust their reserve position in domestic currency, to back
loans to corporate customers (both in national or foreign currency), to support and
make less dependent from national regulations their traditional foreign-exchange
banking activities and to undertake covered interest arbitrage in the foreign exchange
market (i.e., covering in the Euro-dollar market forward transactions undertaken on
behalf of corporate customers). Eurodollars were also increasingly used by banks in
forward calculations, thus enhancing their ability to deal in foreign exchange
transactions. Currency risk remained modest, and so was liquidity risk, due to the
prevalence of interbank business and short-time self-liquidating transactions with non-
bank borrowers71.
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The 1970s however brought home an abrupt shift in riskiness. Increasing
multinationalisation implied the implementation of efficient procedures to monitor and
control a growing number of foreign branches and subsidiaries, usually responsible for
sizeable business, although leaving them adequate scope for independent decisions.
Volatile exchange rates increased currency risk, as a larger share of balance sheet
denominated in foreign currencies created scope for exchange fluctuations to cause
sizeable losses. This forced banks to develop more sophisticated procedures for
monitoring and controlling currency exposures. Even more importantly, a secular rise
in the level of interest rates compounded by unusual instability sharpened interest risk
also, as sudden fluctuations in the cost of funding risked to severely affect profits from
loans of longer maturity at fixed rates.
At the same time, the emergence of the Eurocredit business, the fall in lending
margins (caused by the reversal of US banks' borrowing which left the market with
high liquidity and excess banking capacity), keener competition, a general lengthening
of credit maturities and the expansion and diversification of medium-term lending to
sovereign borrowers contributed to substantially change the pattern of the Euromarkets
activity. As a matter of fact, by funding loans of long contractual maturity through
short-term deposits, as well as mismatching or short-funding rollover deposit maturities
in order to increase the profit yielded, international banks found themselves
increasingly engaged in net liquidity creation.72 Actually all investigations on London
Eurobanks, though adopting different methodologies, have provided clear evidence—
briefly summarized in Table 4—of increasing positive maturity transformation, and
hence of net liquidity production.73
TABLE 4 HERE
As a consequence, growth-oriented commercial banks were urged to develop new
functions of liquidity management. Since Eurodollar borrowing by banks (a part from
US prime-takers) usually relied upon small core deposits and was extensively financed
in the interbank market, liquidity management functions on a cash flow basis became
vital to ensure that maturing deposits could be repaid from the proceeds of maturing
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assets or replaced by fresh borrowing. Reliable access to wholesale market funding
became then a crucial factor for Eurobanking: in this phase, therefore, ‘marketisation’74
meant essentially developing an efficient dealing room function in order to fund the
expansion of international business through managing Eurodollar liabilities. At the
same time banks proved reluctant to absorb the interest rate risk associated with rate
volatility. The introduction of marginal pricing in roll-over lending at floating rates was
an effective response in terms of active asset management which adjusted assets to
potential liabilities and separated interest risk from liquidity risk – although shifting
interest risk to borrowers could harm the latter's ability to service their debts, thus
eventually turn into greater credit and default risk for banks (though shared with all
participants in the syndicates)75.
The new concept of banking based on managed liabilities was bound to prove a
far-reaching structural innovation. Unlike in traditional banking, where liability
management was confined to a few long-run strategic decisions, banking in the
Eurodollar system urged banks to implement totally new strategies for actively
marketing liabilities and funding their growth by tapping wholesale financial markets.
This implied a radical change in the nature of bank liquidity. The traditional concept of
a portfolio of liquid assets (reserves, government securities) that could be turned into
cash at short notice and on predictable terms (by redemption, sale or use as collateral
for borrowing) was increasingly integrated by a new concept of liquidity based on
issuing new liabilities to raise cash in financial markets. In Eurobanking the principle of
a new interactive banking management of the structure of assets and liabilities found its
first materialisation. Eurobanking can therefore be considered the initial breakthrough
of a transition towards an integrated management system based on matching assets and
liabilities as to maturities, currencies and interest rates. Although in the 1960s-70s this
process was mainly limited to international business of top commercial banks of
industrialised countries, in recent periods bank intermediation undertaken on market-
determined terms became an emergent feature of domestic financial systems76.
American banks pioneered this new way of banking. Eurodollar borrowing by
US banks in the late 1960s was a pioneering experience of liability management,
although the revival of the Federal funds market in the 1950s and the emergence of the
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market for bank certificates of deposits and commercial paper in the early 1960s can be
regarded as equally crucial innovations 77 . However, it was the deepening and
globalising of the interbank market that made it possible to such structural change to
have global implications. Eurodollar interbank trading – whose efficiency was greatly
enhanced in the 1970s by the establishment of international, interconnected private
clearing systems such as CHIPS and SWIFT, and new advanced information services
offered to interbank traders by Reuters and Telerate 78 – performed four critical
functions that allowed the market to absorb external shocks and continue to expand: 1)
Liquidity smoothing. The stock of interbank liquid assets acted as a buffer between the
inflow and outflow of funds from deposits and loans, thus reducing transaction costs by
economising on the volume of precautionary balances; Eurobanks held in fact very
small reserves (in the form of negotiable assets), sometimes supplemented by stand-by
facilities from US banks. 2) Liquidity transfer. As deposits of non-bank suppliers were
channelled mainly to banks of high name, size and credit standing, the latter acted as
main intermediaries of the rest of the interbank system. 3) Currency transfer. This
enabled banks to match the currency composition of their assets and liabilities through
interbank trading – an important function in the light of innovative bank products such
as multicurrency trade facilities and eurocredits with multicurrency options. 4) Finally,
global liquidity distribution, which compensated excess demands and supplies between
the Euro-currency centres and a large network of local markets – turning the Eurodollar
and Eurocurrency markets into a true global phenomenon79.
5. Conclusion
Between 1960 and 1980 international finance went through a true revolutionary
process. This paper contended that the emergence of Eurodollar banking lies at the very
heart of such epoch-making structural change in financial technology, and tried to
disentangle the “prime movers” behind it.
Usually technological change, especially in the field of information and
communication, is given a key role among the determinants of recent changes in the
financial structure, mainly due to its impact on transactions costs and information
asymmetries.80 The Eurodollar story is not an exception under this respect, and this
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paper paid attention to the role plaid by technological factors. There is little doubt that
the fast growth of the international money market would have been impossible without
the fall in transaction and communication costs and information barriers allowed by the
emergence of a new global information and communication infrastructure. The key
development from this point of view was certainly the spread of telex networks as the
main medium of intra- and inter-firms communication. Telex increased the speed and
volume of transactions among international banks and favoured the erosion of
information asymmetries between market participants. Together with later
developments such as electronic storage and transmission of data, the global
communication network was at the roots of new management information systems
which enhanced both speed and volume in the transmission and processing of
information within business organizations, both banks and non-banks. Since the late
1960s, these technologies enhanced the emergence of new forms of business
intelligence and management through which both financial intermediaries and corporate
organizations increasingly monitored liquidity and took decisions about managing risk
and raising capital on a transnational or even global scale. Beyond this first-order
impact, information and communication technologies also contributed to increase the
liquidity and marketability of financial products related to the Eurodollar system, and
favoured competition among financial intermediaries, which also had an impact on the
growth of the market.
This paper suggested, however, that beyond purely technological factors,
institutional changes were the critical elements that made Eurodollar banking such a
revolutionary innovation. Under this respect, regulatory arbitrage was a key element in
the process of internationalization of financial intermediaries. Likewise, international
asymmetries in capital and exchange controls as well as in monetary policy-making
created huge and systematic profit opportunities from cross-border and cross-currency
arbitrage in the money markets. This eventually generated the most radically innovative
characteristics of Eurodollar banking, namely the development of active liability
management. This structural change was bound to have profound implications also for
the conduct of monetary policy, as it contributed to undermine the ability of monetary
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authorities to control—and even measure—monetary aggregates, and fostered the
transition to inflation targeting as main monetary policy rule.
Since the 1980s the process of financial innovation set in motion by the
Eurocurrency system gained further momentum. The debt crisis of developing countries
and the global economic recession paved the way to a marked slowdown in
Eurocurrency banking growth rate. Many banks were then thought to have reached a
ceiling as to the internationalisation of their assets and liabilities portfolio, especially in
the light of repeated warnings by supervisory authorities against excessive reduction of
capital ratios. The removal of capital controls as well as more efficient arbitrage and
ever-intense competition further reduced the already narrow margins of Eurobanking,
while demand for Eurocredits was declining relative to emerging securitisation.81 As a
consequence, whereas in the 1960s and 70s liability management had been mainly
“asset driven” (i.e., liabilities were managed to allow banks to expand asset portfolios),
in the 1980s banks abandoned their strong growth-oriented strategies. A more selective
attitude as to profitability and asset quality was then accompanied by a diversification
of funding sources to reinforce the capital component of banks’ liability side (floating-
rate notes, note issuance facilities). Innovative strategies were also pursued that aimed
at exploiting fee-generating business with no expansion of balance sheet, engaging in
dealing of derivatives (such as currency and interest swaps) or assisting customers in
their issues of Eurocommercial paper and Euronotes with syndicated and back-up
facilities, stand-by credit lines, guarantees (i.e., commitment banking). Moreover,
direct use of financial derivatives enabled banks to hedge more efficiently against price
risk through off-balance sheet operations. Eurodollar contracts quickly became the most
significant instruments traded in Chicago and London in terms of open-interest
positions, and also the contracts which banks participated most actively in. Both US
and non-US banks became used to take net long positions (net purchases) in Eurodollar
futures to hedge against their acceptance of Eurodollar deposits as a more efficient
substitute for interbank transactions, mainly because futures positions were not
reflected in the banks' balance sheet, thus reducing the constraint imposed on banks by
market and regulatory constraints on capital ratios.82 These later developments in
financial engineering, directly related to new information and communication
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technologies, are usually regarded as the “core” of the financial revolution of the late
20th century. This paper argues that the revolution started much earlier and was driven
less by technological factors and more by institutional changes.
* * *
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1
International banking, trade and world output
_______________________________________________________________
1964-72 1972-80 1980-85 1964-85
International banking (net)1 33.6 26.7 12.9 25.8
International banking
(gross)2
34.0 28.6 10.8 26.1
International Trade3 12.0 21.2 0.4 12.4
World Output4 9.6 15.0 4.7 10.4
_______________________________________________________________
NOTE. Compound annual growth rate (per cent).
1 BIS series for net size of Eurocurrency market (excluding interbank redepositing among
banks in the reporting area) of Eurocurrency market; data from BIS. BIS reporting area included
only G10 countries in the 1960s and early 1970s and was gradually extended to cover all
European countries and US banks' branches in selected offshore centres.
2 Morgan Guaranty series for gross size of Eurocurrency market (including interbank
redepositing). Differs from the BIS series since it defines the reporting area to cover a larger
number of countries and banks.
3 International trade in goods and services (world excluding Soviet bloc); data from IMF.
4 Gross domestic product (world excluding Soviet bloc); data from IMF.
Source: Bryant (1987): 22.
Table 2
Foreign Banks in Selected OECD Countries, 1960-1981
____________________________________________________________________
Host Country 1960
banks1
1973
banks1
1981
banks1
1960
assets2
1973
assets2
1981
assets2
United Kingdom 51 129 229 Ö Ö 60.2
West Germany 24 773 148 0.5 1.43 3.6
France 33 76 131 7.2 14.1 17.4
Italy 2 15 38 Ö Ö 2.3
Belgium 144 38 56 8.24 28.6 46.8
The Netherlands ... 27 40 Ö Ö 18.0
Luxembourg5 3 56 102 8.0 77.6 85.5
Switzerland 86 99 107 Ö 11.4 11.6
USA ... 124 459 Ö 3.4 13.4
Japan6 34 38 94 Ö 1.6 2.5
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 Number of foreign banking organisations operating in the country through branches or majority-
controlled subsidiaries (year-end data).
2 Foreign banks' assets as a % of total assets of all banks operating in the selected countries.
3 1970.
4 1958
5 Belgian-owned banks excluded.
6 Foreign branches only.
Source: Pecchioli, 1983.
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Table 3
Interest differential between the Eurodollar(1) and US markets(2)
________________________________________ ___________________________
Pre capital
control
(1962-1965)
Capital control
(1966-1973)
Post capital
control
(1974-1985)
Number of
observations
48 96 144
Average differential
(in basis points) 66 103 66
___________________________________________________________________
(1) LIBOR (London interbank offer rate) on 3-month Eurodollar deposits
(2) Nominal interest rate on 3-month US Certificates of deposits
Source: OECD Monetary and Financial Statistics
Table 4
Maturity Analysis of all London banks
Liabilities and claims by maturity as % of total liabilities and assets in foreign
currencies
____________________________________________________________________________
<8d 8d-<1m 1m-<3m 3m-<6m 6m-<1y 1y-<3y =/>3y
liabs-
claims
liabs-
claims
liabs-
claims
liabs-
claims
liabs-
claims
liabs-
claims
liabs-
claims
19731 19.1-14.9 19.5-18.8 26.2-24.8 20.9-20.9 8.8-8.2 2.5-4.8 3.1-7.8
19801 21.1-16.3 18.9-15.3 27.9-23.1 19.7-16.7 7.5-7.4 3.2-6.6 1.7-14.6
19851 22.4-16.4 21.0-16.4 27.2-22.1 16.9-14.4 6.2-6.5 2.6-6.8 3.8-17.4
____________________________________________________________________________
NOTE "d"=days; "m"=month; "y"=year.
1 year-average.
Source: Gibson 1989; data from Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin.
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Figure 1
Euro-dollar and interbank shares of total Eurocurrency market
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NOTE. Dollar-denominated deposits and interbank liabilities as % of estimated gross size of all
Eurocurrencies. Source: Sarver 1988. Data from Morgan Guaranty Trust.
30
Figure 2
Emergence and expansion of Euro-markets, 1964-1985
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Eurocurrency market: estimated gross size of Eurocurrency market including interbank deposits
(foreign currency liabilities of banks from reporting countries vis-à-vis non residents: year-end
amount outstanding). Source: Sarver 1988. Data from Morgan Guaranty Trust. Syndicated
Euro-credits, Source: Fisher 1988. Data from Euromoney; not available prior to 1970.
Eurobonds -Source: Fisher 1988. Data assembled from statistical sources not always
consistent.
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Figure 3
Eurodollar and US money market rates
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NOTE. Monthly nominal interest rates (% p.a.) of 3-month Eurodollar deposits in London, US
commercial banks` 3-month certificates of deposits (CDs), and 3-month US Treasury Bills.
Source: OECD Monetary and Financial Statistics.
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5 Dufey and Giddy 1978: 2.
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interest rates at interest rate parity with respect to forward exchange rates—i.e. non-
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(the "Zurich of Asia", where the bulk of the Asian-Dollar market was located), Hong
Kong, Manila, and off-shore centres (Nassau, Cayman Islands, Panama, Bermuda)
grew rapidly.
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historical antecedents of the Eurocurrency system, but their scale was too small to
influence foreign exchange and money markets in London and New York, or the
international financial system.
10 Holmes and Klopstock 1960; and Altman 1961 and 1963. The latter reported
information from discussions held with central and private bankers in all the main
financial centres of Europe.
11 On transaction costs in the Euromarkets, Agmon and Barnea 1977; Frenkel and
Levich, 1975 and 1977.
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15 See Battilossi 2002 and Ross 2002. Merchant banks and overseas banks used to claim
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George Bolton, chairman of Bolsa), and indeed Eurodollar dealing was known in the
City's financial circles as “the merchants market”. However Schenk 1998 provided
evidence of taking Dollar deposits by one British clearing bank at least since the mid-
1950s.
16 Mayer 1985. Cross-border business implied banking in domestic currency with non-
residents (eg, British banks using Sterling facilities to finance international trade of
European customers). Cross-currency business was banking in foreign currencies with
residents (eg, Italian banks using Dollar facilities to finance international trade of their
domestic customers).
17 McKinnon 1977: 4-5.
18 Bryant 1983: 10-11. Data assembled by Bryant for 15 industrial countries show that
Eurocurrency assets (claims on foreign residents denominated in foreign currencies)
accounted for 56 per cent of total claims with international characteristics in the early
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41
regional US banks; 6) wholly owned US banks in Europe; 7) consortium banks; 8)
Italian banks; 9) Japanese banks. See Sarver 1988: 28-30.
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centralise control of the business. BIS 1983: 15-17.
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24 In fact Eurobanks committed themselves to provide borrowers with a succession of
short-term loans over a medium-term period: see Mendelsohn 1980: 71-86. For
financial innovations related to the emergence of the Eurocredit market, see Dufey and
Giddy 1981.
25 Eurobonds were bonds mainly denominated in dollars and deutsche marks and
placed by international bank syndicates with investors in different European countries.
See Kerr 1984; Fisher 1988.
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Eurocurrency markets created wide yield curves and large profit opportunities on
Eurobond investments. Banks were therefore induced to borrow extensively in the
short-term market to finance voluntary their voluntary holdings of Eurobond.
27 BIS began to publish regular statistics on the Eurodollar and Eurocurrency markets
in 1964. Originally the BIS data included in the Eurocurrency aggregates only claims
and liabilities in foreign currencies vis-à-vis foreign (usually both bank and non-bank)
residents of banks in the Group of Ten countries. Estimates provided by Morgan
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some non-European centres.
28 Such is the meaning of the “net” measures of international banking operations
provided by the BIS and other financial institutions. For a detailed illustration of
Eurocurrency statistics and related methodological problems in measuring
Eurocurrency markets, see Dufey and Giddy 1978: 21-34, and Johnston 1983: 35-55.
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